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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
Lawrence A. Titchell appeals his conviction and sentence 
for two counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 1341, and one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 371. Titchell argues, inter alia, 
that the District Court erred when calculating the"loss" 
attributable to Titchell's conduct under U.S.S.G.S 2F1.1. 





Titchell and his co-defendants, David Wells and Lloyd 
Prudenza, were accused of participating in a scheme to 
fraudulently procure funds from thousands of businesses 
by mailing out fictitious invoices for renewal of telephone 
"Yellow Pages" advertising. Wells and Prudenza were 
fugitives at the time of Titchell's trial, and therefore Titchell 
was tried alone. A jury found Titchell guilty, and his co- 
defendants later pled guilty. The District Court sentenced 
Titchell to a thirty-seven month term of imprisonment and 
a three-year term of supervised release. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. S 3231, and we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 




Titchell raises five issues on appeal: he maintains that (1) 
his indictment was void because it was not signed by the 
grand jury foreperson; (2) the District Court gave an 
erroneous "willful blindness" jury instruction; (3) his trial 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective due to counsel's 
alleged failure to object to the admission of certain 
testimony at trial; (4) his conviction and sentence violated 
the principles announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 430 
U.S. 466 (2000); and (5) the District Court erred when 
calculating the "loss" attributable to Titchell's conduct 
under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. 
 
Titchell's first four arguments can be easily dismissed. 
First, because he did not object at trial, we review for plain 
error Titchell's contention that his indictment is void 
because it was not signed by the foreperson of the grand 
jury. Under the plain error standard, we will grant relief 
only if: (1) an error was committed; (2) the error is plain, 
meaning that it is clear or obvious; (3) the error affects 
Titchell's substantial rights, which normally requires a 
showing of prejudice; and (4) the error seriously affects the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. E.g., United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 
762 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
While the lack of signature on the indictment does 
amount to error, the Supreme Court has explained that 
"the foreman's duty to sign the indictment is a formality, for 
the absence of the foreman's signature is a mere technical 
irregularity that is not necessarily fatal to the indictment." 
Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 345 (1984). Indeed, 
Titchell does not even attempt to meet his burden of 
demonstrating prejudice from the error, and thus the error 
cannot be grounds for relief. 
 
Second, Titchell claims that the District Court gave an 
erroneous willful blindness instruction. The government 
argues that here, too, the standard of review should be 
plain error, because Titchell did not properly object at trial. 
However, Titchell did object at trial to the instruction, 
arguing that it impermissibly lowered the government's 
burden of proof. Supp. App., Vol. II, at 456-58. While 
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Titchell's arguments on appeal do not perfectly track his 
objection at trial, we think they are sufficiently similar that 
the issue is preserved for our review. 
 
That being said, we find no error in the District Court's 
instruction. The court gave the jury a fairly standard willful 
blindness instruction, which stated that the government 
could meet its burden of proving Titchell's knowledge of the 
falsity of his statements if the government establishes 
"beyond a reasonable doubt that [Titchell] acted with 
deliberate disregard" of the truth or with the"conscious 
purpose of avoiding learning the truth." Id. , Vol. III, at 528. 
The court also properly limited this instruction by telling 
the jury that the element of knowledge would not be 
satisfied if Titchell "actually believed the statement[s] to be 
true," and that guilty knowledge "cannot be established by 
demonstrating that [Titchell] was merely negligent or foolish 
or acting out of inadvertence or accident." Id. at 528-29. 
 
The only alleged shortcoming that Titchell identifies in 
the instruction is that it omitted the requirement that "the 
defendant himself was subjectively aware of the high 
probability of the fact in question." Appellant's Br. at 26. 
Titchell describes this as "the high probability 
requirement." Id. Yet our cases make clear that no such 
requirement exists. As we explained in United States v. 
Stewart, 185 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999), "we do not require a 
court's [willful blindness] charge to contain specific 
language that a defendant must have `a subjective 
awareness of a high probability that something is amiss.' " 
Id. at 126 (quoting United States v. Stuart , 22 F.3d 76, 81 
(3d Cir. 1994)). As a result, Titchell's argument is meritless. 
 
Next, Titchell raises a curious argument regarding his 
trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. Titchell's former 
attorney, Mr. Michael Feldman, had testified as a fact 
witness for Titchell in an earlier workers' compensation 
hearing in Ohio. At trial, the prosecution called Feldman as 
a witness to testify regarding statements Titchell had made 
to him, about which Feldman had testified at the workers' 
compensation hearing. Titchell's counsel objected, but the 
District Court allowed Feldman to testify, reasoning that 
Titchell had waived his attorney-client privilege by calling 
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Mr. Feldman as a fact witness in the earlier workers' 
compensation hearing. Supp. App., Vol. II, at 340. 
 
Rather than arguing that the District Court erred, 
Titchell on appeal claims that his attorney's failure to object 
to Feldman's testimony constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Appellant's Br. at 41-46. However, we reject 
Titchell's claim for three reasons. 
 
First, Titchell himself acknowledges that such a claim 
should not be raised on direct appeal, but rather by way of 
a habeas corpus petition. Id. at 42, 46; see, e.g., United 
States v. Mustafa, 238 F.3d 485, 497 (3d Cir. 2001). For 
that reason alone, we need not entertain Titchell's 
ineffectiveness claim. Second, Titchell's claim makes no 
sense because his trial counsel did object to Feldman's 
testimony. Supp. App., Vol. I, at 1a; id., Vol. II, at 338-40. 
Lastly, even had Titchell's trial counsel failed to object to 
Feldman's testimony, Titchell would have suffered no 
prejudice. This is because the District Court was correct to 
admit Feldman's testimony, given that calling one's 
attorney as a fact witness in a prior proceeding constitutes 
a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, at least regarding 
the subject of the testimony adduced in the prior 
proceeding. E.g., Brown v. Trigg, 791 F.2d 598, 601 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (ruling that defendant waived her attorney-client 
privilege when she called an agent of her attorney to testify 
at a prior juvenile court hearing). 
 
Titchell's Apprendi-based argument is also without merit. 
Because he did not object during the district court 
proceedings, we review for plain error Titchell's claim that 
his conviction and sentence violate the principles 
announced in Apprendi. It is well-settled, in both this 
Circuit and others, that Apprendi is not implicated unless 
the defendant's actual sentence exceeds the statutory 
maximum sentence for the crime of conviction. E.g., United 
States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 2000). 
Titchell received a sentence of 37 months, while the 
statutory maximum for mail fraud is five years. 18 U.S.C. 
S 1341. Accordingly, there is simply no Apprendi error in 
this case, plain or otherwise. 
 
Finally, we will address Titchell's last argument, namely 
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that the District Court erred when calculating the"loss" 
attributable to Titchell's conduct under U.S.S.G.S 2F1.1. As 
part of his mail fraud scheme, Titchell mailed out 119,575 
fraudulent invoices for Yellow Pages advertising at $147 
each, for an invoice total of $17,577,525. Apparently, it is 
impossible to ascertain precisely how many of these 
invoices were sent back to Titchell with payment, but when 
the government became involved, it intercepted Titchell's 
mail and seized approximately $647,000 worth of checks 
that were intended to pay for the fraudulent advertisement. 
Supp. App., Vol. III, at 661, 666, 673-74.2 If this $647,000 
constitutes all the money that was sent to Titchell, it would 
represent approximately a 3% return on his mailing, which 
is what Titchell maintains is the norm for this sort of scam 
and what he expected and intended to receive. Appellant's 
Br. at 38; Supp. App., Vol. III, at 663. The government has 
identified only one victim of Titchell's fraud who actually 
lost his $147. Presentence Report, P 28. As part of his 
sentence, Titchell was ordered to pay $147 restitution to 
this victim. Supp. App., Vol. III, at 684. Therefore, the 
record demonstrates a potential loss from Titchell's scam of 
$17,577,525; Titchell argues that his intended  loss was 
only $647,000 (or something closely approximating that 
amount, because he only expected a 3% return on his  
mailing);3 and the actual loss that the government has 
identified is a mere $147. 
 
Titchell was sentenced pursuant to S 2F1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, which establishes a base offense 
level of 6, and then increases the offense level depending on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It is unclear from the record what has since happened to these checks 
-- presumably they remain in the government's possession, or perhaps 
they were returned to their rightful owners -- but certainly they were 
never cashed. 
 
3. Confusingly, Titchell's trial counsel at the sentencing hearing 
repeatedly referred to this $647,000 as the "actual" loss, rather than the 
intended loss. But this cannot be the "actual" loss, because this money 
was intercepted by the government before Titchell could cash the checks. 
Titchell's attorney's mischaracterization is perhaps understandable, 
though, because he was simply trying to impress upon the court that the 
"loss" for Sentencing Guidelines purposes should be far less than the 
potential loss of $17,577,525. 
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the "loss" involved. Application Note 8 states that "if an 
intended loss that the defendant was attempting to inflict 
can be determined, this figure will be used if it is greater 
than the actual loss." The District Court's analysis of 
intended loss consisted of the following paragraph: 
 
       In this case the bulk mailing did (sic) defendant was 
       found guilty of contained 119,575 bogus renewal 
       invoices at a quote of $147 a piece. Thus, intended loss 
       was $17,577,525. Therefore, the increase is warranted 
       and the base offense level is increased to 21. 
 
Id. at 675. The District Court then sentenced Titchell to 
thirty seven months of imprisonment, which is the bottom 
of the Sentencing Guidelines range of thirty seven to forty 
six months for an offense level of 21 and a criminal history 
category of I. 
 
Titchell objected to the District Court's manner of 
calculating intended loss, and thus the issue is properly 
preserved for appeal. Our review of the District Court's 
interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines 
is plenary, but we must accept the District Court's factual 
conclusions unless they are clearly erroneous. E.g., United 
States v. Geevers, 226 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
The resolution of this issue is controlled by Geevers, in 
which we exhaustively analyzed the concept of intended 
loss under S 2F1.1.4 According to Geevers, "[i]t is clear that 
a district court errs when it simply equates potential loss 
with intended loss without deeper analysis." Id. at 192. This 
is because "[t]he fraud guideline . . . has never endorsed 
sentencing based on the worst-case scenario potential loss," 
and "equating possible loss with . . . intended loss" is a 
"linguistic stretch" that we have previously rejected. Id. 
(emphasis in original). Moreover, "[i]ntended loss refers to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Geevers was decided on August 18, 2000, which is several months 
after Titchell's sentencing on February 4, 2000. Yet there are no 
retroactivity concerns with applying Geevers to Titchell's sentencing on 
direct appeal, because Geevers interpreted the same version of S 2F1.1 
as was in force at the time of Titchell's sentencing. The parties agreed 
at 
oral argument that Geevers is controlling; surprisingly, however, neither 
party cited Geevers in their briefs, even though they were filed several 
weeks after Geevers had been decided. 
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the defendant's subjective expectation, not to the risk of 
loss to which he may have exposed his victims." Id. 
Therefore, it is the government's burden "to prove intended, 
not possible, loss if it seeks to increase guideline levels 
faced by the defendant under S 2F1.1." Id. 
 
Despite this warning that district courts should not 
assume that intended and potential loss are the same, the 
Geevers court went on to explain that it is permissible for 
a district court to draw a reasonable inference that the 
defendant intended to cause the full potential loss. Id. at 
192-93. Indeed, such was the case in Geevers, in which we 
affirmed the district court's determination that the 
defendant in a check kiting scheme intended to cause the 
full loss of the face amount of his false checks. Id. In other 
words, the rule established by Geevers is that intended and 
potential loss may be the same (and a district court can 
draw an inference to that effect), but it is error for a district 
court simply to equate the two without "deeper analysis." 
 
It is evident from the transcript of the sentencing hearing 
that the District Court erred by equating potential loss with 
intended loss without the requisite "deeper analysis." As 
noted above, in determining intended loss, the District 
Court merely referenced the potential loss calculation, and 
did not attempt to explain or justify why the potential loss 
in this case should be considered the same as the intended 
loss. The government appears to argue that the District 
Court implicitly drew the reasonable inference that Titchell 
intended to cause the full potential loss from his mail 
fraud. This argument, however, does not satisfy Geevers: if 
district courts could silently draw such inferences, there 
would be little left of Geevers' admonition that district 
courts must perform a "deeper analysis" than simply 
calculating potential loss. 
 
In any event, the government's argument misses the 
mark because the sentencing hearing transcript confirms 
that the District Court did not implicitly draw the 
reasonable inference that Titchell intended to cause the full 
potential loss; rather, the District Court misapprehended 
the Sentencing Guidelines by assuming that intended loss 
and potential loss are essentially the same underS 2F1.1. 
Toward the end of the hearing, when summing up its 
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reasons for imposing the sentence that it did, the District 
Court remarked that: "I've also taken into account the fact 
that technically the potential loss is the one that's used for 
guideline calculations." Supp. App., Vol. III, at 686. 
 
Contrary to the District Court's understanding, potential 
loss is not the measure that is "technically" used for 
guideline calculations; instead, intended loss is the proper 
measure, and the court erred by equating the two without 
further analysis. It is also interesting to note that at 
sentencing, the District Court observed that calculating 
potential loss in this case "overstate[s] the seriousness of 
the offense." Id. This statement seems to reflect the court's 
view that its loss calculation under S 2F1.1 overstated 
Titchell's actual intent, lending further support to the 
conclusion that when calculating loss, the District Court 
concerned itself with only potential loss and not intended 
loss.5 
 
Lastly, assuming that the District Court committed error, 
we must ask if the government has met its burden of 
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The 
government has not even attempted to argue harmlessness 
here, but even if it did, it would have difficulty meeting its 
burden. The possibility clearly exists that the District Court 
would impose a lesser sentence on remand. It is reasonable 
to believe that once the District Court applies the proper 
legal standards under S 2F1.1, intended loss will amount to 
substantially less than $17,577,525, calling for a reduced 
offense level and guidelines range. And if the guidelines 
range were lowered, we certainly cannot assume that 
Titchell's sentence would be unaffected. Thus, Titchell is 
entitled to resentencing. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We have previously noted that "Application Note 11 of S 2F1.1 
specifically provides an escape valve for situations in which the intended 
loss may `overstate the seriousness of the offense.' " Geevers, 226 F.3d 
at 
195 (quoting Application Note 11). In such cases, Application Note 11 
provides that "a downward departure may be warranted." Despite its 
apparent belief that the potential loss overstated the seriousness of 
Titchell's offense, the District Court nonetheless chose "not [to] depart 
below the guidelines." Supp. App., Vol. III, at 686. 
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Accordingly, the Judgment and Conviction Order of the 
District Court entered on February 14, 2000, will be 
vacated and the case remanded for resentencing in 
conformity with this opinion. 
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